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The Future Direction of Investment Agreements in the European Union

First, I would like to express my appreciation both to the Santa Clara University
School of Law, for inviting Prof. Reinisch to present on this important subject, and to
Prof. Reinisch himself, for his comprehensive survey of where things stand and where
things may be going in the European Union with respect to international investment
protection. Obviously, I am also grateful for this opportunity to comment on Prof.
Reinisch’s paper.
As his paper makes clear, the new EU competence over foreign direct investment
presents EU decision makers in all of the EU institutions with a multitude of issues and
all of them are difficult.
To US lawyers these issues may seem unnecessarily complicated. For the US federal
system, these questions are settled by the US Constitution. Internally, we have a single
citizenship, total freedom of movement of capital and universal constitutional
protections, including equal protection under law. Externally, our constitutional
protections extend to foreign investors, the central government enjoys exclusive power in
the area of foreign affairs and the executed central government’s international
undertakings enjoy superiority over the laws of all political subdivisions. As a result, the
issues emerging from the EU’s new competence were more or less resolved long ago
among the fifty United (including the thirteen formerly sovereign) States of America.
But, as was frequently pointed out by the late Prof. Eric Stein, under whom I had the
honor of studying then-EC law at the University of Michigan, such problems are an order
of magnitude more complicated for Europe, with its mixed sovereignty, different
citizenships, wide differences in levels of development and what I see as a broader array
of political viewpoints to be accommodated.
So there are real challenges ahead in formulating EU policy under Articles 206 and
207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”)1 and Prof.
Reinisch’s paper succinctly highlights the major ones. Meeting these challenges will be
all the more complicated by the newly invigorated role that the European Parliament
enjoys in approving any future EU investment treaties, as well as by the increasingly
institution-protective influence that the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”)
will inevitably have in defining limits to those treaties.
I would like to comment on three of the areas of challenge touched upon by Prof.
Reinisch. In particular:
1.What substantive standards are likely to be included in future investment
agreements entered into by the EU?
2.What considerations are likely to apply in the design of investor-State dispute
settlement (“ISDS”) mechanisms?

1.

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May 9, 2008,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 93-94 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:EN:PDF.

161

12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (2013)

3.Is there a place for bilateral investment treaties between Member States (“intraEU BITs) and what will become of them?
Prof. Reinisch assesses the evidence accessible at the time of his paper, including the
“scarce proposals available and some informally leaked documents from the negotiating
process,”2 to venture predictions of likely outcomes on each of these issues, as well as
others, and he is to be commended for his bravery in this endeavor. It is certainly
difficult to convincingly second-guess his well thought out prognostications. At the same
time, it is possible to read that evidence in different ways, as I do, and fast moving
developments on these topics since his paper suggest even more that we may expect
different directions to be taken by the EU than he considered most likely.
On each of these issues, the roles of the European Parliament and the CJEU are
recognized as taking on an increased importance, and positions of the Commission and
Council may be shifting. Moreover, a great deal of new evidence has emerged that
provides an even clearer picture than was possible when Prof. Reinisch wrote. In my
comments, I will refer to the many new discussions of positions by EU institutions
resulting from additional leaked negotiating documents, from the further attention to the
Commission’s proposal for a framework for allocating financial responsibility for ISDS
awards3 and from the recently approved mandate for the Commission to negotiate a free
trade agreement with the United States.4

I. Standards of Protection and Treatment
Substantive standards of protection/treatment are at the core of international
investment agreements, and their specific wording has immense implications for the
impact that such agreements have on the State parties involved and their investors.
During the “modern era” of investor-State arbitration, roughly from 1998 to the present,
a number of the awards that have been rendered on investor treaty claims, often to the
great dissatisfaction of the States involved, have given a clearer picture of the risks posed
by such provisions. Many of these awards have involved disputes under international
investment agreements (“IIAs”) to which an EU Member State is a party and which have

2.
3.

4.
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August Reinisch, The EU on the Investment Path Quo Vadis Europe? The Future of EU BITs
and other Investment Agreements, 8 SANTA CLARA J. OF INT’L L. 111 (2013).
Id. at 119 n.19 (citing Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Establishing a Framework for Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor3state
Dispute Settlement Tribunals Established by International Agreements to Which the European
Union is Party, COM (2012) 335 final (June 21, 2012) [hereinafter European Commission
Proposal], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149567.pdf).
Press Release, 3245th Council Meeting, Foreign Affairs Trade, Luxemburg Council of the E.U.,
10862/13
(June
14,
2013),
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/EN/foraff/137486.pdf.
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traditionally used broadly worded language to describe the substantive protections and
treatment that the investors are provided.
Prof. Reinisch sees strong evidence that IIAs negotiated by the EU under its new
competence will follow the route taken in Member State BITs including the broad
standards they traditionally employ. This evidence includes the 2010 Commission
Communication “Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy”
which “repeatedly mentions member State BIT provisions ‘that should inspire the
negotiation of investment agreements at the EU level.’”5 It also includes the Council’s
instructions for on-going negotiations on comprehensive trade agreements with Canada,
India and Singapore, which he sees as reflecting in their comments on the investment
chapters to be included a Council preference for a “traditional ‘European’ approach of
strong investment protection including ISDS.”6
Prof. Reinisch does acknowledge that, based upon its 6 April 2011 resolution, “On the
future of European international investment policy,” the European Parliament “appears
much more reluctant towards the traditional strong investor protection contained in
many European BITs” and is “much more nuanced, if not reserved, than that of the two
other main EU institutions.”7 But this may understate the divide that then existed
between the Parliament and the other EU institutions. It is possible to see this evidence,
and more recent indications, as pointing to standards emerging from EU action that will
diverge greatly from the more open-ended language of contemporary Member State BITs,
and more closely resemble those adopted by the North American States.
First, consider that the term “standards of protection” is just one side of the coin; the
same language defines “standards of liability” as well. This vantage point changes the
perspective of the decision-maker considering treaty language. This is clear in the
concerns expressed in the European Parliament’s 2011 resolution, which includes the
following observations:
G. whereas after the first dispute settlement cases of the 1990s, and in spite of
generally positive experiences, a number of problems became clear because of the
use of vague language in agreements being left open for interpretation, particularly

5.

6.
7.

Reinisch, supra note 2, at 124 (citing Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, COM (2010)
343 final (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Commission Communication], available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/tradoc_146307.pdf).
Reinisch, supra note 2, at 122. See also Reinisch, supra note 2, at 122-23 nn. 37 & 49 (citing
Council Negotiating Directives (2011, EU-Canada/India/Singapore FTAs), BILATERALS.ORG,
(Sept. 15, 2011), available at http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article20272&lang=en).
Reinisch, supra note 2, at 122; see also Reinisch, supra note 2, at 121 n. 31 (citing European
International Investment Policy: European Parliament Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the
Future European International Investment Policy (2010/2203(INI)), Oct. 2, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C
296)
[hereinafter
2011
Parliament
Resolution],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:296E:0034:0040:EN:PDF).
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concerning the possibility of conflict between private interests and the regulatory
tasks of public authorities, for example in cases where the adoption of legitimate
legislation led to a state being condemned by international arbitrators for a breach
of the principle of ‘fair and equitable treatment,’ [and]
H. whereas the USA and Canada, which were among the first states to face such
rulings, have adapted their model BITs in order to restrict the breadth of
interpretation by the arbitration and ensure better protection of their public
intervention domain.8
The Parliament was looking at the prospect of EU treaties as not only providing for
protection of EU investors abroad, but as creating liability for the EU and Member States
that might impede public authorities from carrying out regulatory tasks. It is clear that
this anxiety stems not only from commonly expressed civil society concerns regarding the
environment, sustainable development and public health, but also from an acute
appreciation of the actual decisions that have emanated from arbitral tribunals since the
1990’s. These years of experience have only lightly touched the major capital-exporting
states of the EU, which have not been the targets of many investor claims. But this is
changing as we now see claims challenging Germany’s shift away from nuclear power9
and, perhaps even more importantly, claims now emerging challenging actions taken by
states in reaction to the fiscal crisis of 2008-09 in Belgium10 and, more recently, in
Greece11 and Cyprus.12
As a result of its concerns, the Parliament’s resolution expressly “call[ed] on the
Commission to produce clear definitions of investor protection standards in order to
avoid” overly broad interpretations inconsistent with “legitimate public regulations.”13
The resolution specifically urged, for example, that any requirement for fair and
equitable treatment be “defined on the basis of the level of treatment established by
international customary law,” and that provisions regarding expropriation be given “a
definition that establishes a clear and fair balance between public welfare objectives and
private interests.”14 It expressed similar concerns regarding national treatment and
most favored nation treatment.15 It also asked the Commission “to assess the potential

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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2011 Parliament Resolution, supra note 7, pmbl.
Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, (status
of proceeding Pending registered May 31, 2012) (on file with ICSID).
Ping An Life Insurance Company of China, Limited and Ping An Insurance (Group) Company
of China, Limited v. Kingdom of Belgium, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/29, (status of Proceeding is
pending, registered Sept. 19, 2012) (on file with ICSID). The author wishes to disclose that his
firm represents Belgium in this matter.
Poštová banka, a.s. and ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8,
(status of proceeding is pending, registered May 20, 2013) (on file with ICSID).
Marfin Investment Group v. The Republic of Cyprus, Notice of Dispute (Jan. 23, 2013) (not
public).
Reinisch, supra note 2, at 132 (citing 2011 Parliament Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ 24).
2011 Parliament Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ 19.
2011 Parliament Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ 19.
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impact of the inclusion of an umbrella-clause in future European investment
agreements.”16
The Commission and the Council initially gave the Parliament’s concerns on these
issues short shrift.
Their immediate responses were more consistent with the
“traditional approach” than with a reappraisal and revision like that advocated in the
Parliament’s resolution. The Commission did state that it “could” explore the possibility
of adopting language that “would possibly express in more explicit terms the common
understanding of the EU and its negotiating partners as to the scope of the obligations
enshrined in the agreed standards.” 17 At the same time, however, it maintained that
there was a “common understanding among experts in the field (lawyers, academics,
arbitrators, judges) with respect to [the] content and meaning” of BIT standards and
strongly defended the “subjective element” of arbitrators’ interpretation of standards as
permitting the “flexibility” necessary for the application of the standards in specific
situations.18
And while the Council’s leaked directions for negotiations on comprehensive trade
agreements for the Canada, India, and Singapore specified that standards “shall be
without prejudice to the right of the EU and the Member States to adopt and enforce, in
accordance with their respective competences, measures necessary to pursue legitimate
public policy objectives such as social, environmental, security, public health and safety
in a non-discriminatory manner,” its targets for fair and equitable treatment (“ FET”)
and expropriation include no limitations.19 In this manner, as Prof. Reinisch points out
that, “the instructions appear to favour the traditional European approach by adhering
to a rather concise treaty text, without clarifications limiting the scope of FET and
indirect expropriation as they are known from US and Canadian BITs as well as NAFTA”
and thereby avoid “NAFTA-contamination.”20

16.
17.

18.
19.

20.

2011 Parliament Resolution, supra note 7, ¶ 20.
Follow Up to the European Parliament Resolution on the Future European International
Investment Policy, Adopted by the Commission on 5 July 2011, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7-TAPROV(2011)0141
5
(2011),
available
at
www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/spdoc.do?i=19829&j=0&l=en)
Id. at 4-5.
General Affairs Council, EU Negotiating Mandates on Investment (2011, EUCanada/India/Singapore
FTAs),
BILATERALS.ORG
(Sept.
15,
2011),
http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article20272&lang=en (publishing leaked “text of the
negotiating mandates approved by the General Affairs Council for investment protection chapters
in free trade agreements of the EU with Canada, India and Singapore”).
Reinisch, supra note 2, at 123 (citing Luke E. Peterson, EU Member-States Approve Negotiating
Guidelines for India, Singapore and Canada Investment Protection Talks; Some European
Governments Fear “NAFTA-Contamination, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER (Sept. 23,
2011), http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110923_2 (article available through subscription or
purchase).
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The underlying issue of “NAFTA-contamination” is the tendency of North American
States to laden their modern IIAs with qualifications and explanations designed to
accomplish the regulatory space they saw as having been threatened by some of the early
awards of NAFTA investor-State arbitral tribunals. Famously, these qualifications and
explanations include innovative language incorporated in the 2004 US Model BIT. The
language resulted after a prolonged attempt by US officials to find formulas for
expressing the operational standards that would provide a real measure of protection for
US investors abroad while cabining State liability and carving out the kinds of measures
that even capital-exporting countries take for granted that they may employ to protect
the public interest. As a direct participant in this effort, specifically head of the US State
Department’s office in charge of international claims and investment disputes, I can
testify that, after a monumental effort, this noble goal proved elusive and the drafters
had to settle for explanatory language, exceptions, and even admonitions to future
arbitral tribunals.
For example, rather than using language that would expressly define conduct
considered to be inconsistent with acceptable conceptions of fair and equitable treatment,
the 2004 US Model BIT requires “treatment in accordance with customary international
law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security,” stating that
this means only “the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of
aliens.”21 It then specifies the obligation not to deny justice as a single example of what
the customary international law minimum standard includes.22 Previously, the US had
stated its view that the international minimum standard of treatment is comprised of
sets of rules pre-existing in the customary international law.23 Thus, in contrast to
application by arbitral tribunals of FET provisions not tied to customary international
law, the 2004 US Model BIT’s concept of FET, as merely a referent to the pre-existing
minimum standard of treatment, truly would clearly seem to “have the potential to

21.
22.
23.
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Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
[Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Model BIT].
See id. art. 5(2)(a).
See, e.g., ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, PostHearing Submission of Respondent, (June 27, 2002), 6-7 ICSID Rep. 470 (2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/11662.pdf (“The ‘international minimum standard’
embraced by Article 1105(1) is an umbrella concept incorporating a set of rules that over the
centuries have crystallized into customary international law in specific contexts. The treaty term
‘fair and equitable treatment’ refers to the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment. The rules grouped under the heading of the international minimum standard include
those for denial of justice, expropriation and other acts subject to an absolute, minimum standard
of treatment under customary international law.”) (citations omitted) (The author wishes to
disclose that he was counsel for the United States in connection with this case.).
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considerably lower the level of investor protection and, conversely, increase the
regulatory discretion of host states.”24
The difficulty of articulating a clear operational definition of indirect expropriation
provides another example of how the 2004 US Model BIT had to settle for elaborations
and explanations to convey meaningful protection within desired limits. First, it
proposes that future signatory states expressly “confirm their shared understanding”
that the model’s expropriation provisions are “intended to reflect customary international
law concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation.”25 Second, it
provides that the case-by-case analysis needed to determine an indirect expropriation
must be based upon a consideration of three factors, borrowed from the US Supreme
Court’s famous Penn Central26 test, namely, “(i) the economic impact of the government
action . . . ,” admonishing that an adverse effect on economic value alone does not
establish an indirect expropriation; “(ii) the extent to which the government action
interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the
character of the government action.”27 Third, it includes a declaration, intended as
guidance for future arbitral tribunals, that ‘[e]xcept in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect
legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment,
do not constitute indirect expropriations.”28
Finally, in lieu of an umbrella clause, the 2004 US Model BIT provides that its
investor-State dispute settlement provisions applicable to breaches of the substantive
standards of the model shall also apply to alleged breaches of any “investment
agreement,”29 defined narrowly as an agreement with national authorities with respect to
natural resources development, the supply of public utilities and infrastructure
projects.30
The determination of some Member States acting through the Council to immunize
the EU from NAFTA-contamination and pursue what Prof. Reinisch describes as
“traditional” European approaches to standards of protection and treatment31 was
carried through deep into negotiations with Canada, with the EU holding to a conception
of FET untethered to customary international law, an extremely narrow exception to the
expropriatory effect of regulatory actions and to a broad umbrella clause.32
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Reinisch, supra note 2, at 130.
2004 Model BIT, supra note 21, annex B, 1.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
2004 Model BIT, supra note 21, annex B, 4(a)(i)-(ii).
Id. annex B, 4(b).
See id. art. 26.
Id. section A.
See Reinisch, supra note 2, at 117, 123.
Canada-EU CETA Draft Consolidated Text – February 2012, WORLD TRADE ONLINE 15-16, 1819 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.tradejustice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/CETA-Text-
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However, the European Parliament does not appear ready to cede the issue to the
other institutions. In May 2013, after debating the Commission’s proposal for a
framework for allocating financial responsibility for ISDS awards,33 the Parliament
adopted a series of amendments at odds with both the Council and the Commission.34
One amendment drew a direct link between the question of financial responsibility and
the breadth of treaty standards, noting that “[f]inancial responsibility cannot be properly
managed if the standards of protection afforded in investment agreements were to exceed
significantly the limits of liability recognized in the Union and the majority of the
Member States.”35 Accordingly, it recommended that future treaties should afford “no
higher level of protection than Union law and the general principles common to the laws
of the Member States grant to investors from within the Union.”36 Another amendment
declared that “the Union's liability for legislative acts, especially in the interaction with
international law, must be framed narrowly and cannot be engaged without the clear
establishment of fault.”37
The Parliament’s latest remonstrations are clearly having an impact. Indeed, during
the debate over the Commission’s proposal, the Commission responded to questions by
offering reassurances “that the level of investment protection afforded by future
investment agreements to foreign investors will be in line with general principles
common to EU and Member State law . . . [and] in line with the best practices of EU
Member States.”38 This represents a subtle but significant shift on previous formulations
that called for new treaties to be based upon “Member States’ experience and best

33.

34.

35.
36.
37.
38.

168

February-2012.doc (article available through subscription or purchase) (publishing leaked text
pertaining to “secret negotiating process of the Canada-European Union free trade negotiations
(CETA)”).
See generally European Commission Proposal, supra note 3; see generally Responsibility in
Investor-State-Arbitration in the EU, EUR. PARL. DOC. PE 457.125 (2012), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN
&file=79450 (setting forth results of a study commissioned by the European Parliament’s
Committee on International Trade, upon which Parliament, in part, based its amendments);
see generally Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Financial Responsibility in the European International
Investment Policy, (LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Paper Series, Paper No. 15/2013,
2013), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2271526.
Amendments Adopted by the European Parliament on 23 May 2013 on the Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Framework for
Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-State Dispute Settlement Tribunals
Established by International Agreements to which the European Union is Party (COM(2012) 0335
final (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0219+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
Id. amend. 4.
Id.
Id. amend. 5.
See Remarks of Commissioner De Gucht, EUR. PARL. DEB. (339) (May 22, 2013), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20130522&secondRef=ITE
M-019&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0124.
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practise regarding their bilateral investment agreements.”39 The new formulation implies
that it is the best practices of Member States’ law that is important, not the best
practices of their investment treaties. Moreover, the Commission stated that it “is
endeavouring to better clarify the content of our investment protection standards without
reducing the level of protection, for example by including useful guidance on the practice
of arbitral tribunals,”40 signaling that, as had already been expressed by the Parliament,
the decisions of arbitral tribunals on traditional standards have to be taken into account
in the design of future standards.
On the ground, developments also point to a shift in the EU negotiating positions. For
example, it appears that the disavowal of any connection between FET and the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment that reflected the EU’s
opening position with Canada41 has given way to at least a partial connection.42 This
perhaps should not be seen as such difficult step for the EU to take given the strong roots
that such a connection has in the history of European BITs, originally based as they were
on the OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property.43 That
Convention, drafted in 1962 and approved by the OECD in 1967,44 made express the fact

39.
40.
41.
42.

43.

44.

EU Negotiating Mandates, supra note 19.
See Commissioner De Gucht in the Plenary debate in the European Parliament on May 22, 2013,
supra note 38.
See Canada-EU CETA Draft Consolidated Text – February 2012, supra note 32.
See EU, Canada Approach to Investment Could Have Mixed Impact on U.S. Talks, WORLD
TRADE ONLINE (June 28, 2013), http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade06/28/2013/eu-canada-approach-to-investment-could-have-mixed-impact-on-us-talks/menu-id710.html (article available through subscription or purchase). (“A confidential text on the
investment provisions of the Canada-European Union free trade agreement (CETA) shows that
the two parties have broken new ground in defining the key concept of fair and equitable
treatment for investors. The language that they have agreed upon contains similarities but also
differences to the approach that the United States has taken in its investment deals, which could
pose problems in the upcoming U.S.-EU trade and investment talks, according to copy obtained by
Inside U.S. Trade. Moving closer to the U.S. negotiating stance, the EU has agreed to partially
link a government's obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment to investments with the
concept of customary international law. It does so by stating a violation of the fair and equitable
treatment under the CETA is any treatment contrary to the fair and equitable treatment
obligation recognized by the general practice of states as accepted as law, which experts say is a
clear reference to customary international law”). It should be noted that the EU has also
announced that it will embark on negotiations with China. See Commission Proposal to Open
Negotiations for an Investment Agreement with China IP/13/458, COM (2013) 358 final (May 23,
2013), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=900. China’s prototype BIT
does not link FET to customary international law. See People’s Republic of China, Agreement
Concerning The Encouragement & Reciprocal Protection Of Investments [Prototype], art. 3(1),
http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/Compendium/en/65%20volume%203.pdf.
See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990’S 54 (1998). (“The use of the standard of fair and
equitable treatment in BITs dates from the OECD 1967 Draft Convention on the protection of
Foreign Property.”).
ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE
PROTECTION
OF
FOREIGN
PROPERTY
(1962)
available
at
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that requirement of Article 1 to “‘ensure’ fair and equitable treatment of the property of
the nationals of the other Parties,”45 “conforms in effect to the ‘minimum standard’ which
forms part of customary international law.”46 It appears that, in this respect at least, the
EU is merely catching up to its own heritage in accepting a more NAFTA-like approach
in its negotiations with Canada; it will bear watching whether the EU will be forced to
move even further in its talks with US.
Similar movement also appears to be developing with respect to expropriation
standards. While the EU’s opening position with Canada had included guidance that
superficially resembled the 2004 US Model BIT declaration regarding indirect
expropriation, a leaked text from subsequent rounds of negotiations are reported to
include a significant relaxation.47 Whereas the opening text stated that a State’s nondiscriminatory measures are subject to a straightforward proportionality test and are
recognized to be non-expropriatory only if they are “necessary’ and applied in a way that
“genuinely meet[s]” stated objectives, the new text apparently covers any such measure
unless it is “so severe in light of its purpose that it appears manifestly excessive”; the
proposed necessity and genuineness tests have been dropped.48
Recent reports do not include information about a possible resolution of differences
regarding the protection of contract rights and whether the EU is similarly relaxing its
positions on umbrella clauses. However, it is noteworthy that the EU has intensified its

45.
46.
47.
48.
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http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/39286571.pdf. The Draft
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efforts to have government procurement included in its negotiations with the US49 since
a potential conflict arises between these two aims. This is an area where tribunals have
made widely varying holdings, but one line of cases has held that the umbrella clause –
under which a State undertakes generally that it will fulfill all other obligations it has
entered into with respect to an investment – elevates all contract disputes with the State
into treaty disputes, and all contract breaches into treaty breaches.50 Under this view, a
treaty umbrella clause would trump EU Member State special mechanisms for the
resolution of procurement disputes. It may well be that these two goals will collide in the
course of negotiations.
Whatever its initial goals when it first began outlining its preferred positions on
treatment and protection standards under its new competence over FDI, the EU appears
to be reconciling itself to concerns expressed by the EU Parliament and long recognized
by the North American States.51 Future EU BITs are likely to set the bar on prohibited
State conduct much more carefully, and much more specifically, than have traditional
EU Member State BITs.

II. Investor-State Dispute Settlement
The movement we have seen in the EU in recent months on standards of conduct and
treatment are being matched by non-traditional thinking concerning dispute settlement.
Indeed, the debate that has been engendered as the EU approaches the prospect of
agreeing to arbitrate treaty claims with American investors is pointing in the direction of
a fundamental re-examinations of dispute settlement institutions.
The “tradition” of EU BITs was built upon agreements between EU capital exporting
Member States and countries that were essentially capital importers in the developing
world. As a result, the exporting States saw little threat in waiving sovereign immunity
and agreeing to arbitrate compliance of their own public decisions with international law
principles, since it was unlikely that there would be many such tests. This was
previously the same for the United States and Canada. But this all changed with
NAFTA, which represents the first time that two countries with major bi-directional
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2005),
available
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For critical recognition of this prospect, see Nikos Lavranos, The New EU Investment Treaties:
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flows of investment have agreed to ISDS for related disputes. The US and Canada
already had a trade agreement in place between them, but in seeking to include
investment protection and bring Mexico into the arrangement, they were forced to add
ISDS to address what were perceived to be concerns about the Mexican courts. The
result has been that all of the numerous ISDS proceedings against Canada have been
brought by US nationals, and all but one of the numerous ISDS proceedings against the
US have been brought by Canadian nationals. This is clearly what is facing the EU in its
efforts to strike trade deals with the Canada and the US that include investment
protection; inevitably, numerous claims will be brought against them under any ISDS
mechanism included in the resulting agreements.
Nonetheless, as Prof. Reinisch points out, after some initial reluctance, the EC
eventually weighed in heavily in favor of including ISDS in future BITs entered into
under its new competence.52 Moreover, despite its concerns with the latitude enjoyed by
arbitrators under the ISDS system,53 the Parliament also took “the view that, in addition
to state-to-state dispute settlement procedures, investor-state procedures must also be
applicable in order to secure comprehensive investment protection.”54
The traditional approach to ISDS has been to import the commercial arbitration
model into treaties. This has been a curious, and too little remarked upon, development.
One cannot read the debates among the drafters of the ICSID Convention, for example,
without realizing that they very much had in mind using ISDS primarily for contract
disputes with States, a natural progression of commercial arbitration techniques.55 Little
debate was had on the implications of using the commercial model to resolve treaty
claims for violations of international legal principles.56
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But the commercial arbitration model was designed to resolve unique, private contract
disputes, principally because it was seen as faster, cheaper and more confidential than
court proceedings. It relies upon private, generally part-time (and even only occasional)
arbitrators from the private business sector, as opposed to public officials or judges. It
gives both of these private disputing parties an equal role in selecting arbitrators. It
affords arbitrators tremendous latitude in deciding claims with less than strict adherence
to legal principles because their decisions are not subject to any meaningful review of
legal holdings or factual findings.
These characteristics have served the commercial sector well, but are they equally
appropriate for treaty claims, which involve a sovereign State party, the public interest,
public policy decisions and repeated invocation of the same international law standards?
The greatest discomfort with the “fit” of commercial arbitration with treaty claims has
been expressed with regard to (1) lack of transparency, which commercial arbitration’s
emphasis on confidentiality entails, and (2) inconsistent decisions, a direct result of the
decentralized nature of arbitration and the relative lack of review.
The EU institutions are all well aware of the transparency problem and have included
means of addressing it in their design of EU investment protection policy. Prof. Reinisch
points out how the Commission has led in proposing transparency measures,57 including
public access to requests for arbitration and other written submissions, open hearings,
amicus curiae briefs and the publication of awards.58 These objectives were all included
in the leaked draft 2012 ISDS text the Commission developed for use in future EU BITs,
and in the Canada, India and Singapore negotiations in particular.59 Indeed, the
Commission stated that “[t]he inclusion of effective rules on transparency is
unavoidable.”60
The more difficult problem is that of arbitral outcomes, of which inconsistency has
been the main concern voiced. Criticisms based on the lack of consistency in ISDS
usually frame the issue as one of impeding predictability and therefore efficiency of
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investment decisions and certainty in public policy decisions.61 But whenever there are
two or more divergent lines of decision on frequently invoked provisions that are common
to many treaties, as we have seen on numerous such issues, the problem goes way
beyond unpredictability. It goes to whether too many tribunals are misinterpreting, and
thus misapplying, these common provisions; on any particle issue, only one of the
divergent lines of reasoning can be right.
One solution might be to narrow the universe of deciders by having a closed roster of
arbitrators. This may have been what the Commission had in mind when it floated the
idea of “quasi-permanent arbitrators” in its 2010 Communication.62 In the event, this
notion has apparently gone no further than the proposed creation of an agreed list of
arbitrators from which appointing authority appointments may be made, when required
– hardly a novel idea.63
But much more significant is the renewed attention given to the possibility of
establishing an appellate process for a broader and more substantive review of arbitral
awards than is currently available under post-award proceedings under municipal law or
the ICSID Convention. In the author’s view, this would be the single most effective way
to reduce inconsistency and, more importantly, increase accountability for arbitral
awards.
The issue appears to be trending in favor of more serious consideration of an appellate
mechanism in future EU BITs. The Commission stated that “appellate mechanisms”
should be considered in its 2010 communication, together with or as an alternative option
to “quasi-permanent arbitrators.”64 The Parliament was more direct in its 2011
resolution, calling, not merely for consideration of the issue, but expressly for the
inclusion of “the opportunity of parties to appeal.”65
The Commission’s draft 2012 ISDS text would establish a “Committee for the
Settlement of Investor-State Disputes” made up of representatives of the treaty parties
and, among other things, would require it to examine “whether, and if so, under what
conditions an appellate mechanism could be created or integrated into this section to
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review, on points of law, awards rendered under this [treaty] section.”66 This goes
somewhat beyond the requirement that the US has been able to include in all of its
modern IIAs calling upon the parties to consult within a stated period of time on the
possibility of an appeals mechanism, leaving, however, adoption of such a mechanism to
possible future amendment of the agreements;67 disappointingly, it does not appear that
the required consultations have ever been held in connection with any of those
agreements within the periods provided or since. But the draft Commission text goes
even further to empower the Committee to itself “amend this section in order to create, or
integrate, an appellate mechanism if the Committee concludes that this is desirable.”68
The most recent indication of direction of EU intentions does not go so far as the
Commission’s draft ISDS text. Perhaps in light of the serious constitutional problems
that would inevitably arise for the US side in allowing a treaty provision to be amended
by a bilateral committee, the leaked Council Negotiating Directives of June 14, 2013 for
negotiations on a comprehensive trade and investment agreement with the United States
only provides that “[c]onsideration should be given to the possibility of creating an
appellate mechanism applicable to investor-to-state dispute settlement under the
Agreement.”69
It is of course difficult to judge whether it will eventually be EU policy to insist upon
award review in its IIAs. The Parliament’s position appears clear and the Commission
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and Council have evidenced a heightened awareness of the problems that have prompted
calls for such review. The technical difficulties with creating a workable appellate
mechanism are not to be underestimated. But as the EU enters into serious negotiations
with the US, it will become increasingly apparent the stakes in getting the ISDS
mechanism right are higher than they have ever been. This could very possibly lead to
the revolutionary step of subjecting ISDS to the kind of accountability that municipal
courts face as a matter of course.
But it appears that there may be even more revolutionary thinking afoot as the EU
struggles with the implications of its new competence in light of the uncertainties of the
current ISDS system. As Prof. Reinisch points out, the early thinking regarding
investor-State arbitration of all of the EU institutions included the option of opting for
“the Calvo-inspired, Australia-US BIT approach to abandon it outright and to rely
exclusively on domestic courts.”70 It is therefore ironic that, after moving quickly to a
consensus in favor of investor-State arbitration, there are now unmistakable signs of a
fundamental reassessment.
The first hint of this came in the Parliament’s 2011 resolution calling for inclusion of
“the obligation to exhaust local judicial remedies where they are reliable enough to
guarantee due process.”71 Proposing to reinstate the local remedies rule where there are
reliable court systems in place raises, of course, the very real question of whether it is
worth having a completely separate second level of dispute resolution at all. Over the
next two years, the Parliament’s thinking took that very turn during the 2013 debates on
the Commission’s proposal regarding financial responsibility for ISDS awards arising
from future agreements. One spokesman stated that his group “does not believe that
investor-state dispute settlements are necessary between mature legal systems,”
mentioning Canada and the US in particular.72
The amendment to the Commission proposal adopted after the debate provided that
ISDS can be included in future EU IIAs only “[i]n the cases where it is justifiable.” As
explained in the Parliament’s accompanying summary of the amendments, “Members
consider that it is not obligatory to include an investor-to-state dispute settlement
mechanism clause in future EU investment agreements and that their inclusion should
be a conscious and informed policy choice that requires political and economic
justification.”73 Thus, the Parliament, which must approve future agreements, has
strongly signaled that ISDS is not to be considered an indispensable element of
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investment protection and that the risks posed by the ISDS system must be weighed
against the gains. This would be surprising enough had not the Commission indicated
that it fully agreed with this approach.
In his answer on this point during the debates, Commissioner De Gucht stated that
“[o]bviously you need [ISDS] when it is an agreement with a third country that does not
have a properly-functioning judicial system, where one can have doubts about the rule of
law.”74 The implication is clear: the US-Australia solution of dispensing with ISDS
altogether is a real option for the EU.
Subsequently, in its directives for the negotiations with the US, the Council did not
expressly engage in such “Calvo-inspired” heresy, but nonetheless left no doubt that it
considers the need for ISDS to be an open question, stating that “[c]onsideration should
be given . . . to the appropriate relationship between ISDS and domestic remedies. . . The
inclusion of investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) will
depend on whether a satisfactory solution, meeting the EU interests concerning [other
issues], is achieved.”75
Thus, a major shift appears to be brewing in the EU that was only hinted at six
months ago. If ISDS finds its way into future EU IIAs at all, a question that may depend
upon the identity of the EU counter-party concerned, it is likely to carry features that
will dramatically affect its operation. At very least, IIAs emerging from the new
competence of the EU are likely to be quite innovative and will set a new standard for
balancing the rights of investors and the prerogatives of States, and in inserting a
greater measure of accountability into the commercial arbitration model.

III.Intra-EU BITs
Whether future EU BITs include ISDS, and how ISDS will look if they do, will also
accentuate the uncomfortable place that inter-EU BITs hold within the EU legal
structure. Prof. Reinisch gives a fair overview of the issues implicating the continued
viability of the 17676 existing intra-EU BITs and reviews how BIT tribunals have dealt
with some of those issues. As he points out, arguments that intra-EU BITs are no longer
valid and that their arbitration provisions are no longer operative, and thus that
tribunals lack jurisdiction, have not fared well before tribunals that have considered
them thus far.
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He is certainly correct in stating that these issues must, and will, eventually be
authoritatively resolved by the CJEU. This may happen sooner than later; there are a
number of actions in EU Member State courts that raise these issues either in connection
with efforts to overturn arbitral awards rendered after tribunals have upheld the
continued validity of intra-EU BITs or that involve direct court claims for treaty
violations.
In the meantime, the issues are likely to be addressed by yet other investor-State
tribunals under intra-EU BITs, based upon new considerations and developments.
Despite previous adverse outcomes, I believe that the arguments against such continued
validity and “operativeness” are compelling.77
When a State accedes to the EU it enters into an entirely new legal order and a
fundamental re-organization of its economic relations with all other Member States. The
legal relations previously governed by any BITs there might be between the acceding
State and existing Member States are, upon accession, addressed simultaneously, if in
different ways, by the new EU legal order to which they have subscribed. Both the BITs
and the EU legal order govern the free movement of capital under uniform principles of
non-discrimination and treatment, with a constant recognition of rights in property.
Thus, they address the same subject matter, even if the scope of EU law is much wider,
and thus qualify for the threshold application of tests of incompatibility found in the
international law principles reflected in Articles 59 and 30(3)78 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.
It is difficult to conceive how the patchwork of bilateral treaties between only certain
pairs of Member States, with different provisions and scopes of application, could be
anything but incompatible with the uniform and comprehensive principles of EU law.
This is true with respect to the standards of State conduct applicable under the BITs
compared to those applicable under EU law, which inevitably lead to specific
incompatibilities (as was shown in the instance of extra-EU BITs in the infringement
proceedings against Finland, Sweden and Austria, cited by Prof. Reinisch in the extra-
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EU BIT context79). But is also clearly evident with respect to the contending roles
foreseen for arbitral tribunals in BITs and for courts in the EU treaties.
With respect to questions of EU law, which arise necessarily in every intra-EU BIT
case at least with respect to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, ISDS provisions clash in
particular with two provisions of the TFEU regarding the roles of EU courts. The first
conflict arises with TFEU Article 344, which provides that “Member States undertake
not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any
method of settlement other than those provided for therein.”80 As Prof. Reinisch notes, in
the Mox Plant case, the then-named European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) held that Member
States violate this provision when they arbitrate issues that fall within the scope of EU
competence and thereby putting at issue the interpretation or application of EU law.81
But Prof. Reinisch’s statement that “both the Mox Plant case as well as Article 344
TFEU expressly refer to inter-state disputes”82 is not correct to the extent that its
suggests that that provision does not affect investor-State arbitration under inter-EU
BITs. The ECJ decision in Mox Plant certainly concerned an inter-State dispute, but it
nowhere suggested that Article 344 is limited to cases involving only State parties.
Moreover, the text of Article 344 itself is manifestly silent in this respect and the absence
of any limitation to inter-State disputes could very well suggest instead that any
submission by a Member State, regardless of the character of the counter-party to the
dispute, to a non-EU treaty forum violates the obligation of Article 344. As one
commentator has recently pointed out, the fact that there is conclusive authority that
Article 344 applies to disputes between Member States and that it does not apply to
disputes between private parties “does not say anything yet regarding a dispute with one
Member State on the one side, and one private individual on the other.”83 Thus, whether
ISDS provisions in intra-EU BITs violate Article 344 if far from a closed question.
The second conflict arises with TFEU Article 267, which provides that, whenever a
question of interpretation of the EU treaties must be ruled on in order for a “court or
tribunal of a Member State” to render a judgment, it may, and if a court of last resort, it
must, request the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on the question.84
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together with Article 344, aims to avoid divergences in the interpretation of EU law and
to ensure that EU law is given its full effect within the framework of the judicial systems
of the Member States. Because investor-State tribunals, to whom Member States submit
via their BITs questions of EU law, are not “courts or tribunals” of Member States, they
deprive Member State courts themselves from exercising their role in the important
control function of Article 267.
It was on this basis that, in its Opinion 1/09 on the European and Community Patents
Courts, the CJEU struck down the disputes procedures proposed in a draft agreement
developed by the Council to be entered into by the EU and by Member States and third
countries who are parties to the 1973 European Patent Convention.85
Under those
procedures, a specialized court system, with both first instance and appellate courts,
would have had jurisdiction to hear disputes between individuals related to European
and Community patents under the Convention and proposed EU legislation.86 The CJEU
observed that the envisaged patent court system would be called upon, inter alia, to
interpret and apply provisions of EU law, effectively stripping Member States courts of
their jurisdiction over the same disputes. In doing so, it would:
[D]eprive courts of Member States of their powers [provided in Article 267] in
relation to the interpretation and application of European Union law and the Court
of its powers to reply, by preliminary ruling, to questions referred by those courts,
and, consequently, would alter the essential character of the powers which the
Treaties confer on the institutions of the European Union and on the Member
States and which are indispensable to the preservation of the very nature of
European Union law.87
Thus, it was not the inability of the special patent courts themselves to refer questions
of EU law to the CJEU that caused the problem – contrary to what Prof. Reinisch could
be read as suggesting, they would in fact have been empowered to do so under language
virtually identical to Article 26788 – it was the displacement of the ability of Member
State courts to do so that made the scheme incompatible with the EU treaties.89

85.
86.
87.
88.
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the Union;
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall
bring the matter before the Court.”).
See Opinion 1/09, Creation of a Unified Patent Litigation 2011 E.C.R. I-0137, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CV0001:EN:PDF ECR
I-0137 (Mar. 8, 2011).
Id. ¶¶ 3-12.
Id. ¶ 89.
“Article 48 of the draft agreement states: 1. When a question of interpretation of the [EC Treaty]
or the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the European Community is raised
before the Court of First Instance, it may, if it considers this necessary to enable it to give a
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Under this same reasoning, investor-State treaty tribunals similarly deprive Member
State courts from playing their role on questions of EU law before them and would
therefore similarly be in violation of EU law; the conferral of jurisdiction upon investorState tribunals by intra-EU BITs is in the same sense incompatible with the exclusive
jurisdiction of the EU judicial system. Certainly, Opinion 1/09 casts serious doubt as to
whether the CJEU would be prepared to consider such tribunals as compatible with
Article 267.90
Finally, not only are there serious questions about the compatibly of the arbitration
provisions of intra-EU BITs with the exclusive jurisdiction of the EU juridical system,
but those provisions are inherently discriminatory with regard to Member States which
are not party to any particular BIT, and with regard to their nationals. Both the
arbitration provisions and the substantive standards/treatment provisions of such BITs
are available only to the State parties to the BIT and their investors. But, according to
TFEU Article 18, discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited.91 The case law
of the CJEU establishes that a breach of the legal duty of non-discrimination flows from
the mere existence of the discriminating provision in the international instrument in
question, and a breach exists until a remedy is employed.92
In the view of some, this conclusion does not mean the BITs’ arbitration provisions
should be considered inoperative, since these discriminatory effects can be cured by each
offending State by extending the obligations it owes to the other State and to its investors
to all Member States and their investors.93 However, quite apart from the practical and
legal obstacles to unilateral extension – which, as established in the jurisprudence of the

89.
90.
91.
92.

93.

decision, request the Court of Justice . . . to decide on the question. Where such question is raised
before the Court of Appeal, it shall request the Court of Justice . . . to decide on the question.” Id. ¶
12.
“The draft agreement provides for a preliminary ruling mechanism which reserves, within the
scope of that agreement, the power to refer questions for a preliminary ruling to the [special
patent courts] while removing that power from the national courts.” (emphasis added.). Id. ¶ 81.
Cf. Reinisch, supra note 2, at 153 (“It cannot be excluded that the CJEU would consider investorstate arbitration incompatible with such a far-reading interpretation of its own interpret
prerogatives [as is found in Opinion 1/09].”).
TFEU, supra note 1, art. 18 (“Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality
shall be prohibited.”).
Case C-471/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium [2002] ECR I9681, ¶¶ 141, 143 (“ . . . the direct source of that discrimination is not the possible conduct of the
United States of America but Article 5 of the Bermuda II Agreement, which specifically
acknowledges the right of the United States of America to act in that way . . . . The efforts made by
the Kingdom of Belgium to eliminate the incompatibility of the clause with Article 52 of the
Treaty, however commendable, are clearly insufficient to disturb the finding made in the
preceding paragraph.”).
See, e.g., Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, Case No. 088/2004, Partial
Award, at para. 170 (Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 2007),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_eastern_sugar.pdf.
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ECJ, would not undo the incompatibility in the meantime94 – the extension of dispute
settlement mechanisms would certainly aggravate the concerns regarding the
preservation of the nature of EU law.
Thus, despite the lack of success such arguments have had to date before investorState tribunals, it is clear, as Prof. Reinisch acknowledges, that there are significant
problems with the existence of a parallel system involving Member State parties capable
of interpreting and applying EU law.

IV. Conclusion
The introduction of the EU as a major player in the field of investment protection and
ISDS portend, in my view, significant changes in direction from the patterns established
by previous Member State BIT practice. The issues raised by the traditional statements
of State party obligations found in most BITs, and more than fifteen years of troubling
experience with the ISDS system, have already led to a substantial re-appraisal of some
of the most important underpinnings of the existing system. The fact that Canada, the
US and China are among the countries first up for EU consideration has highlighted the
tremendous stakes at issue. And the deviations from previous patterns that we will
likely see in EU BITs in expressing standards of conduct and treatment, and in the
providing for ISDS (if it is provided for at all), will together also accentuate the
uncomfortable place that existing intra-EU BITs occupy in the EU legal system.

94.
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See, e.g., “Contrary to what the Kingdom of Belgium maintains, the direct source of that
discrimination is not the possible conduct of the United States of America but Article 5 of the
Bermuda II Agreement, which specifically acknowledges the right of the United States of
America to act in that way. 142. It follows that the clause on the ownership and control of
airlines is contrary to Article 52 of the Treaty. 143. The efforts made by the Kingdom of
Belgium in 1995 to eliminate the incompatibility of the clause with Article 52 of the Treaty,
however commendable, are clearly insufficient to disturb the finding made in the preceding
paragraph.” Case C-471/98, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of
Belgium, 2002 ECR I-9681, ¶¶ 141-143.

